Calming the Hearse Horse: a Philosophical Research Program for Legal Ethics by Luban, David
Maryland Law Review
Volume 40 | Issue 3 Article 7
Calming the Hearse Horse: a Philosophical
Research Program for Legal Ethics
David Luban
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Legal Profession Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
David Luban, Calming the Hearse Horse: a Philosophical Research Program for Legal Ethics, 40 Md. L. Rev. 451 (1981)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol40/iss3/7
CALMING THE HEARSE HORSE:
A PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCH PROGRAM
FOR LEGAL ETHICS*
DAVID LUBAN**
Why is there always a secret singing
When a lawyer cashes in?
Why does a hearse horse snicker
Hauling a lawyer away?'
Carl Sandburg
The study of legal ethics is part of the study of ethics, and the study
of ethics is part of philosophy. In a nutshell, this is why an adequate
legal ethics curriculum must do more than examine the ABA Code of
* © 1981 by David Luban. All rights reserved. I have received helpful comments on
earlier drafts from Peter Brown, Bob Condlin, Ted Finman, Geoffrey Hazard, Andrew
Kaufman, the Honorable Robert Keeton, Michael Kelly, Mark Sagoff, and Charles Work.
They are, of course, not responsible for any errors in this article. This research was funded
in part by the Maryland Bar Foundation.
** B.A. 1970, University of Chicago; Ph.D. 1974, Yale University; Research
Associate at Center for Philosophy and Public Policy, University of Maryland, and
University of Maryland School of Law.
1. C. SANDBURG, The Lawyers Know Too Much, in SMOKE AND STEEL 85 (1948). The
full poem reads:
The lawyers, Bob, know too much.
They are chums of the books of old John Marshall.
They know it all, what a dead hand wrote,
A stiff dead hand and its knuckles crumbling,
The bones of the fingers a thin white ash.
The lawyers know a dead man's thoughts too well.
In the heels of the higgling lawyers, Bob,
Too many slippery ifs and buts and howevers,
Too much hereinbefore provided whereas,
Too many doors to go in and out of.
When the lawyers are through
What is there left, Bob?
Can a mouse nibble at it
And find enough to fasten a tooth in?
Why is there always a secret singing
When a lawyer cashes in?
Why does a hearse horse snicker
Hauling a lawyer away?
The work of a bricklayer goes to the blue.
The knack of a mason outlasts a moon.
The hands of a plasterer hold a room together.
The land of a farmer wishes him back again.
Singers of songs and dreamers of plays
Build a house no wind blows over.
The lawyers - tell me why a hearse horse snickers hauling a lawyer's bones.
(451)
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Professional Responsibility and the case law; it must also incorporate
philosophical arguments and writings geared specifically to lawyers'
ethical dilemmas. The problem is that only a handful of philosophically
informed books and articles on lawyers' ethics exist. The philosophical
issues in legal ethics need more research, and the legal ethics
curriculum needs the written products of that research.
My aim in this paper is to convince you of this, by laying out a
philosophical research program for legal ethics. By this I mean a survey
of the hard, unsolved, and mostly unexplored issues in legal ethics that
are amenable to treatment by moral philosophy. The survey is not
meant to be exhaustive, and I do not doubt that other, perhaps better,
ways of laying out the problems might be found. It is characteristic of
philosophy that disagreements are as much over the way questions are
posed as over the way they are answered. Even if the research program
I am proposing seems wrong-headed, it will serve its purpose if it incites
the reader to come up with a better one.
The need for new curricular materials in legal ethics has become
evident. Since 1974, all American law schools have been required to
offer a course in legal ethics (or "professional responsibility") to receive
ABA accreditation; as of 1978 the course was a requirement for
graduation in 85%2 of American law schools, and was taken by over
30,000 law students each year. Despite these facts, and the demand for
the course they indicate, the professional responsibility curriculum is
not wholly satisfactory to law students or professors. A recent survey of
over 1,300 students indicated that the professional responsibility course
is held in "low esteem" and "may even be socializing students into
believing that legal ethics is unimportant. ' 3 Much of this low esteem
can be attributed to the nature of the material.
The conduct of lawyers is, of course, regulated by a written code of
ethics (the ABA's Code of Professional Responsibility in most states)
which has statutory force. The study of the Code language and its
underlying public policy considerations is the main focus of existing
textbooks in legal ethics. That is fine as far as it goes, but it does not go
far enough. The Code of Professional Responsibility is less sophisticated
than other parts of the black-letter law. Enforcement is generally
reserved for the most egregious violations, and consequently the body of
case law in professional responsibility is small and the litigation is not
very complex. For this reason, the intellectual content of Code-centered
2. M. KELLY, LEGAL ETHICS AND LEGAL EDUCATION 2 (1980).
3. Id. at 2-3 (discussing Pipkin, Law School Instruction in Professional Responsibil-
ity: A Curricular Paradox, 1979 A.B.F. RES. J. 247).
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courses in professional responsibility pales by comparison with, say,
Federal Jurisdiction or Contract Law.
In addition, students may be hostile to the course for defensive
reasons: it tells them what to do and how to conduct their careers. Some
of the constraints it discusses may work against the young lawyer's
economic self-interest; others, which propose limits to adversariality on
behalf of clients, seem to undermine the whole point of legal work,
namely doing a job for the person who hires you. The Code attempts to
justify its rules by stating the profession's ideals in the form of so-called
"Ethical Considerations." In my experience, however, students find the
Ethical Considerations vague, self-serving, and rhetorical - really just
an incantation of slogans (The Adversary System, The Lawyer-Client
Relation, The Service-Oriented Profession, The Law Reformer).
The problem is that slogans will not do when the subject is the
validity of these very slogans. There is a basic ambivalence in such a
course: is it just another law school course analyzing a piece of the law
(the Code of Professional Responsibility), or is it a course on ethics in a
broader sense? The course seems to promise the latter, but traditional
teaching methods usually deliver only the former. Law students want to
address the wider questions in a way that is as intellectually rigorous as
the study of, say, Constitutional Law. They complain that the analysis
of a written code of rules, even buttressed by more general discussions of
public policy, does not approach the dilemmas of legal practice in a
sufficiently reflective way. The dilemmas need a theory, and the textual
materials should provide it.
The legal profession has tried to provide guidance. In 1952, the
American Bar Association and the Association of American Law Schools
established a Joint Conference on Professional Responsibility to bring
"home to the law student, the lawyer and the public an understanding
of the nature of the lawyer's professional responsibilities."4 The Joint
Conference Report defended the lawyer against "the layman's charge
that he is nothing but a hired brain and voice." 5 It analyzed the various
roles a lawyer plays. Some of this analysis found its way into the ABA
Code. The tone of the Code is optimistic:
Not every situation which [a lawyer] may encounter can be
foreseen, but fundamental ethical. principles are always present to
guide him. ...
The Code of Professional Responsibility points the way to the
aspiring and provides standards by which to judge the transgressor.
4. Fuller & Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44
A.B.A.J. 1159, 1159 (1958).
5. Id.
19811
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. . . So long as its practitioners are guided by these principles, the
law will continue to be a noble profession.
6
This optimism has not been borne out by experience. The Code fails
to provide guidance in many situations; 7 some of its provisions are
virtually unenforceable; some have been found illegal by the courts.8
The courts have disciplined lawyers for violating the Code's merely
"aspirational" Ethical Considerations as well as its mandatory Disci-
plinary Rules.9 The Code has been sharply criticized for failing to sort
out the lawyer's conflicting obligations." ° Partly in response to the
perceived inadequacy of the Code, a new ABA Commission on Evalua-
tion of Professional Standards has proposed a total revision of the Code.
At this writing the commission (often called the "Kutak Commission,"
after its chairman, Robert J. Kutak) has circulated unofficial versions of
the new Model Rules of Professional Conduct. These rules are them-
selves highly controversial." Indeed, in response to them two alterna-
6. Preamble to ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1979) [hereinaf-
ter cited ABA CODE].
7. To cite two examples: (1) G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 43-68
(1978), shows that the Code is premised on the single, identifiable client, and cannot be
cogently interpreted in many corporate situations; (2) Note, Client Fraud and the Lawyer:
An Ethical Analysis, 62 MINN. L. REV. 89 (1977), shows that the Code as interpreted in the
ABA opinions on ethics does not yield an answer to the question of whether to disclose
client fraud in many cases. These examples could, of course, be multiplied. See generally
ABF ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1979).
8. E.g., Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (prohibition of lawyer
advertising held violative of first amendment); In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1977)
(anti-solicitation rules).
9. Committee on Professional Ethics of the Iowa State Bar Ass'n. v. Behnke, 276
N.W.2d 838, 840 (Iowa 1978) (disciplining attorney for violating EC 5-5).
10. See Morgan, The Evolving Concept of Professional Responsibility, 90 HARV. L.
REV. 702 (1977); Patterson, Wanted: A New Code of Professional Responsibility, 63
A.B.A.J. 639 (1977); Wolfram, Barriers to Effective Public Participation in Regulation of
the Legal Profession, 62 MINN. L. REV. 619 (1978); Frankel, Book Review, 43 U. CHI. L.
REV. 874 (1976) (The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility).
11. The Kutak Report is discussed in Review Symposium - The Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, 1980 A.B.F. RES. J. 926; COMMIrrEE ON PROFESSIONAL AND JUDICIAL
ETHICS, ASSOCIATION OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, PRELIMINARY REPORT OF THE
ABA PROPOSED MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, Jan. 30, 1980 DRAFT (July 1980);
Kaufman, A Critical First Look at the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 66 A.B.A.J.
1074 (1980); Kutak, The Next Step in Legal Ethics: Some Observations About the Proposed
Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 30 CATH. U. L. REV. 1 (1980); Luban, Professional
Ethics: A New Code for Lawyers?, 10 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 11 (June 1980); Correspond-
ence between Monroe Freedman and David Luban, 10 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 4 (Oct.
1980); R. Abel, Why Does the American Bar Association Formulate Rules of Professional
Conduct? (unpublished article, forthcoming in TEX. L. REV.); Landesman, Confidentiality
and the Lawyer-Client Relationship (unpublished article, forthcoming in UTAH L. REV.).
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tive codes have been proposed. 2 The "fundamental principles," what-
ever they are, have proven far more elusive than the framers of the
Code anticipated.
Perhaps for this reason, a recent survey of fifty professors who teach
professional responsibility revealed that one-third of them found
existing texts inadequate for their purposes and preferred to assemble
their own packages of materials.' 3 Professor Andrew L. Kaufman of
Harvard Law School described the problem:
One difference between the teaching of professional responsibility
and other law school courses is the relative lack of sophisticated
writing in the field. The subject has been neglected for so long that
the number of books and articles that treat the issues studied in the
typical course with insight is relatively small, especially when one
considers the breadth of the field. This paucity of material also
exists if one considers' other extremely relevant areas of knowledge
- historical and sociological studies in the profession and writings
in moral philosophy specially devoted to the law.'4
Many teachers want to supplement existing materials with philosophi-
cal work, and this has created a demand which, as Professor Kaufman
indicates, is as yet unfilled.
Moral philosophy can help fill the gap because it is an investigation
of the reasons for actions: it considers how one justifies what one does.
Its distinctive feature is that it makes a person press the question of
justification further than he is normally accustomed to doing. Thus, a
lawyer might ordinarily answer the question, "Why did you do X?" by
saying "Because the Code of Professional Responsibility says that that's
what a lawyer must do." A moral philosopher is likely to press the
question further by asking-whether there are good reasons for doing
what the Code prescribes in that situation. The ultimate aim is to
justify actions in terms of principles that provide the best and most
coherent account of our moral perceptions. 15 To apply moral philosophy
to the legal profession, we must identify the ethical problems faced
peculiarly by lawyers and suggest, where possible, principles that will
12. COMMISSION ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, ROSCOE POUND - AMERICAN TRIAL
LAWYER'S FOUNDATION, THE AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT (June 1980); THE
NATIONAL ORGANIZATION OF BAR COUNSEL, REPORT ON A STUDY OF THE PROPOSED ABA
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS (1980).
13. M. KELLY, supra note 2, at 28.
14. Kaufman, Law and Ethics, The Teaching of Ethics: A Preliminary Inquiry, 7
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 7 (1977).
15. This view is derived from J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 46-52 (1971).
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guide them in resolving these problems. What follows will illustrate the
possibilities for such a philosophical research program.
EXAMPLES OF MORAL DILEMMAS FACING LAWYERS
Public opinion is not kind to lawyers. Thoughtful lawyers are apt to
suggest that the public confuses the morality of a lawyer with that of
his client: it assumes that a profession which is willing to counsel
dishonest and unworthy clients is itself unworthy and dishonest. But, it
is added, the public is wrong, for if lawyers were to do otherwise they
would be setting themselves up as private gatekeepers of the legal
system. For this reason, it is the essential condition of advocacy that the
attorney's morals and the client's are distinct.'"
A lawyer, then, may have a moral duty to assist in an immoral
case. How can this be true? Ordinarily, we think that no one is morally
bound to assist immorality. We may describe this as a conflict between
ordinary morality and the role morality of lawyers. These do not always
conflict, of course. For example, both ordinary morality and role
morality would condemn a lawyer who swindles a client. But there will
be cases in which the conflict is quite pointed, and these entitle us to
ask how the demands of a professional role can override moral
requirements which we thought were binding on everybody.
Most texts on professional responsibility work from examples. Many
of these examples, however, do not represent conflicts between ordinary
morality and role morality. Rather, they are puzzles over whether a
certain act violates the Code. Many conflict-of-interest cases, for
example, present situations as abstract and formal as chess problems,
and often do not raise questions of ordinary morality. Conversely, some
genuine conflicts between role morality and ordinary morality may not
be found in textbook problems because the lawyer's duty under the Code
is clear. Here are some examples of genuine conflicts between ordinary
morality and lawyers' role morality.
Example 1 The client is the prosperous president of a savings and
loan association. In leaner days he had borrowed
16. See ABA CODE, supra note 6, at EC 2-26 thru EC 2-28; EC 7-17. Lawyers
themselves commit the same confusion, if confusion it is. A recent sociological study of
lawyers' own perceptions of the prestige of different practices yielded a surprising result.
Prestige did not correlate with the obvious variables, such as money or specialty. Rather it
correlated with the prestige of the client: the higher the prestige of the client, the higher
the prestige of the lawyer. Even in the minds of practitioners, the lawyer and the client
are identified. See Heinz & Laumann, The Legal Profession: Client Interests, Professional
Roles, and Social Hierarchies, 76 MIcH. L. REv. 1111 (1978).
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almost $5,000 from a man working for him as a
carpenter. He now wishes to avoid repaying the debt
by pleading the statute of limitations."7 He is sued by
the carpenter and retains a lawyer.
The Code is unambiguous about the lawyer's duty in this example: "A
lawyer shall not intentionally . . . [flail to seek the lawful objectives of
his client through reasonably available means permitted by
law. .. ." This Disciplinary Rule, moreover, is an uncontroversial
portion of the role morality of lawyers. Thus, the role demands that the
lawyer assist his client in this project. From the point of view of
ordinary morality, however, it is wrong to assist someone in reneging on
his legitimate debt.
Example 2 The client has raped a woman, been found not guilty
by reason of insanity, and institutionalized. He wishes
to appeal the decision by asserting the technical
defense that he was denied his right to a speedy
trial. '9
In this example the client is not attempting to do something immoral,
but it is nevertheless clearly contrary to the general interest to loose a
mad rapist on the public. From the viewpoint of ordinary morality, the
lawyer who asserts this defense is behaving irresponsibly. As in the
previous example, however, the lawyer has an adamantine duty to
assert his client's legal rights, including the technical defense.
Example 3 A youth, badly injured in an automobile wreck, sues
the driver responsible for the injury. The driver's
defense lawyer has his own doctor examine the youth;
the doctor discovers an aortic aneurism that the boy's
doctor had not found. The aneurism is life-threatening
unless operated on. The doctor reports to the defense
lawyer that if the aneurism was not there when the
plaintiff's doctor had examined him, this would indi-
cate that it was a result of the accident. The plaintiff is
17. Zabella v. Pakel, 242 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1957) (cited as an example in Fried, The
Lawyer as Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relation, 85 YALE L. J.
1060, 1064 (1976). Compare D. HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDIES 754, at XII (1836)
(pleading the statute in such a case involves the lawyer in "knavery") with G. SHARSWOOD,
LEGAL ETHics 83 (1854) (the lawyer must plead the statute).
18. ABA CODE, supra note 6, at DR 7-101 (A)(1).
19. This example is taken from Langworthy v. State, 39 Md. App. 559, 387 A.2d 634
(1978), rev'd, 284 Md. 588, 39 A.2d 578"(1979).
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willing to settle the case for $6,500, but the defense
lawyer realizes that if the youth learns of the aneur-
ism he will demand a much higher amount.2"
Once again, the lawyer's role-responsibilities are unambiguous. He
must keep the client's secrets unless the client is contemplating
commission of a crime. Secrets are "information gained in the pro-
fessional relationship . . . the disclosure of which . . . would be likely
to be detrimental to the client.",21 Thus, the knowledge of the aneurism
is a secret. Nevertheless, it is plain that ordinarily, without the special
duty of confidentiality, it would be incumbent on a person to tell the
youth. An innocent life may be at stake.
Example 4 The client is accused of rape, but claims the prosecut-
rix "consented in every way," and instructs his attor-
ney to enter a plea of not guilty. As they prepare for
trial, an embittered former suitor of the victim tells
the attorney that he knows she is promiscuous. In this
jurisdiction a defense of unchastity is still legally
valid, and the ex-suitor's testimony would probably
suffice to obtain acquittal. It is likely, moreover, that
such testimony would ruin the victim's reputation in
the small town where she lives, and would lead her
fiancd to break off their engagement. During the trial
the client admits to the attorney that his story is a lie,
but insists on pressing the defense, which he says he
has used successfully on another occasion. Should the
attorney put the ex-suitor on the stand?
22
Once again, the lawyer's unequivocal role-derived duty is to offer the
defense as effectively as possible.
In discussions of examples like these, the point is often made that
the lawyer is free to refuse the case. Now, refusal or withdrawal from a
morally troublesome case may be the most practical method to relieve a
lawyer of an otherwise intolerable conflict. But the fact that such a
strategy is available does not resolve the moral issue itself, for some
lawyer will have to take the case. If it is morally obligatory for the "last
lawyer in town" to do so, it surely must be morally permissible for him.
20. Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 263 Minn. 346, 116 N.W.2d 704 (1962).
21. ABA CODE, supra note 6, at DR 4-101(A).
22. Adapted from Symposium, Standards of Conduct for Prosecution and Defense
Personnel, 5 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 8 (1966) and M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY
SYSTEM 43-49 (1975). See also D. MELLINKOFF, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER 186-87,
204-11 (1973).
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But, of course, what is permissible for the last lawyer is permissible for
any lawyer, else legal ethics becomes a matter of musical chairs, in
which the last lawyer to opt out of the role is the loser. Thus, the
possibility of opting out does not yield a strategy for reconciling the
lawyer's role with ordinary morality. Nor does it resolve the examples to
note that in some the problem arises from a law that permits morally
dubious outcomes. It is too simple to blame the law rather than the
lawyer, for in every case the lawyer must decide to be the agent who
brings about the outcome. It is the lawyer who pushes the red button.
He cannot escape the fundamental conflict between ordinary and role
morality that these examples illustrate.
LEGAL ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
I shall now argue that no written code is capable of resolving the
tensions between ordinary and role morality. Codes should be seen as
simply one part of the black-letter law, a proper object of legalism and
casuistry. A lawyer caught in a conflict between role obligations and
ordinary morality - a conflict heightened by the fact that the client is
paying the fees - is inevitably tempted to view the Code as telling him
what he can get away with. Indeed, since the Code requires zeal on
behalf of the client, it can be argued that anything the Code does not
forbid the lawyer from doing for the client is required. In practice, I
suspect that any code would be read this way, whether it mandated zeal
or not. Similarly, a typical law review article on the ethics of dealing
with client perjury will go through various black-letter rules concerning
client perjury, attempting to resolve ambiguities and inconsistencies
among them, in borderline cases. The question is always, "Is this
allowed?" It is true that the policies behind the rules are examined to
shed light on the meaning of the rules; nevertheless, the act in question
turns out to be either 100% permissible or 100% forbidden.
This, however, is a simple-minded view of morality. It suggests that
a person is good who does not break the rules; the only question then
concerns degrees of goodness, which can be left to the angels to decide.
Moral life is not like that. A person may do things which are within
his moral rights, but which nevertheless would open him to moral
criticism. Brian Barry tartly observes, "Victorian novels and biog-
raphies are thickly populated with self-righteous prigs who never did
anything wrong . . . but still managed to make life hell for everyone
around them."2 3 And one cannot state in the form of a rule that
following the rules is not good enough.
23. Barry, Book Review, 88 YALE L.J. 629, 643 (1979) (C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG).
My argument is derived from this review at 637-43.
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Another reason exists for saying that ethics and regulation don't
coincide. The reason may be stated in the form of a paradox: regulation
is supposed to resolve a certain type of problem; ethically perfect
regulations, however, recreate this problem rather than resolve it; thus,
imperfect regulations may be better than perfect ones. Let us see why
this is so.
Adversarial tactics, in law as elsewhere, tend to escalate more or
less independently of anyone's intentions. Game theorists call the
structure that compels escalation a "Prisoner's Dilemma" 24 : a lawyer
engages in the practice because not to do so would put him at a
disadvantage relative to other lawyers who do. All the lawyers might
recognize that it would be better for all concerned if no one engaged in
24. The Prisoner's Dilemma is so called because the following story, attributed to
A.W. Tucker, is often used to illustrate it:
A and B, suspected of a crime, are placed in separate cells. The district attorney
knows he doesn't have the evidence to convict them; he needs a confession from at
least one. In order to obtain it, he tells each of them (separately) the following: (a) If
either of you confesses and turns states evidence and the other doesn't, the one who
confesses will go free and the other will get ten years; (b) If both of you confess, you
will each get five years; (c) If neither of you confesses, you will each get 1 year on the
lesser charge of carrying a cencealed weapon.
Assume that neither A nor B cares what happens to the other. What should either of them
do in order to save himself? Game theorists represent the situation in the following
matrix:
1R
Confess
A
Do Not Confess
Confess Do not Confess
-5 -5 0 -10
-10 0 -1 -1
In each box the left number represents A's payoff in years; the right number represents
B's. A reasons as follows: "B can either confess or not. If B confesses, my better option is to
confess (five years rather than ten). If B does not confess, my better option is, once again,
to confess (zero years rather than one). Thus, no matter what B does, I should confess." Let
us call this the "dominance argument" because the strategy of confessing dominates the
strategy of not confessing.
B, however, reasons the same way. Thus, both A and B are driven by the
dominance argument to confess, even though both of them can see that this pair of
strategies leads to a much worse outcome than if neither of them confesses. Both of them
realize this, but it doesn't matter: the problem is that each knows that the other has the
dominance argument available to him. Even if A and B both want to refrain from
confessing, and both believe that the other wants to as well, it won't help. The problem is
that A knows that B knows that A is aware of the dominance argument; thus, A knows
that B has a reason for confessing, namely that B suspects that A might confess. Knowing
this gives A a reason to confess. Obviously, the levels of mutual mistrust can multiply
indefinitely. The point is that the bare possibility that either A or B might mistrust the
other - and how could that possibility be ruled out? - generates the Prisoner's Dilemma.
The Prisoner's Dilemma is the subject of a vast literature. A clear account may be
found in R. LUCE & H. RAIFFA, GAMES AND DECISIONS 94 (1957).
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the practice, but this recognition, even buttressed with the knowledge
that other lawyers share in it, does not help anyone unilaterally refrain
from it.
Such practices - of which the tactical motion to disqualify opposing
counsel is one example 25 - tend to move the behavior of the profession
toward its lowest common denominator, more or less independently of
what lawyers really want. Code regulations interrupt this process by
allowing lawyers to behave "well" safely, without worrying that they
will be punished for their restraint by other lawyers unilaterally
defecting from high standards. In this sense, the purpose of regulations
is not to force lawyers to toe the line against their will, but to enable
them to act as they would wish to anyway.
This will not happen unless the regulations are enforced. And
enforcement, in turn, will prove impossible if the standards are set too
high, even if everyone wishes to comply. If a lawyer thinks the
standards are high, he will think that ethics committees are likely to
allow violations to go unsanctioned. Once this bare suspicion establishes
itself, the margin of mistrust that generates the Prisoner's Dilemma is
back. Perhaps a lawyer does not think the regulations are onerous to
comply with; even so, if he believes others will find them stringent, he
will expect them not to be enforced. Once again, the Prisoner's Dilemma
appears. Indeed, this will happen even if no lawyers are bothered by a
regulation, but some believe that others believe they might be. Such is
the logic of suspicion.
It follows that regulations should be much less stringent than moral
considerations alone might dictate - mild enough, we might say, to
avoid even the appearance of unenforceability. Paradoxically, a code
which is morally second-best might be better than best. The rules
should lie just at the margin between unenforceability and insubstan-
tiality.
In addition, a code must spell out its requirements in reasonably
specific rules. That often means providing detailed procedures and
drawing behavioral lines the particulars of which are not justified by
appeal to moral theory.
But if this is so, and if as a consequence the written codes of ethics
must distort moral requirements by practical ones, we have additional
grounds for the claim that the moral problems will not be served by an
analysis of codes.
This is not to say that codes of ethics have no place; rather, it is to
suggest that their place is in the sphere of black-letter law, on a par
25. Mills, Litigation Ethics - Motions to Disqualify: Caveat Advocatus, 6 LITIGATION
47 (Fall 1979).
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with the laws of legal malpractice and licensing.2 6 Viewed in this way,
legalistic interpretation makes perfect sense. We may refer to this
branch of positive law as professional responsibility. "Legal ethics," on
the other hand, will denote the study of the moral problems confronting
lawyers. The preceding considerations show that professional responsi-
bility is not the same as legal ethics. An examination of legal ethics,
nevertheless, should contribute to a code of professional responsibility.
Lawyers' responsibilities will be clarified by the analysis of moral
problems of their practice, and this is the task of legal ethics.
ROLE MORALITY
Legal ethics, I have suggested, is concerned primarily with conflicts
between ordinary morality and the role morality of lawyers. This
generates questions on two levels: individual problems which lawyers
face in their day-to-day practice, such as the examples given above; and
institutional questions concerning the lawyer's role in society, such as
the justification of the adversary system and delivery of legal services.
First, however, the distinction between role and ordinary morality
needs theoretical credentials,2 7 for it does not lack obscurities. How can
role morality conflict with ordinary morality? If it is morally wrong for
me to harm an innocent person gratuitously, then how can going to law
school, being admitted to the bar, and taking money for the deed make
it right?28 Sociologists suggest, however, that we always act in some
social role or other.29 Every role carries its own behavioral norms. By
that reasoning, all moralities must accommodate to roles. It is hard to
see which side is right.
Indeed, one may be skeptical of the very distinction between role
and ordinary morality. There is only one morality, we may say, but
26. See Ladd, The Quest for a Code of Professional Ethics: An Intellectual and Moral
Confusion, in COMMITrEE ON SCIENTIFIC FREEDOM AND RESPONSIBILITY, AMERICAN ASSOCIA-
TION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF SCIENCE, AAAS PROFESSIONAL ETHICS PROJECT 154 (1980).
27. The classic statement (and criticism) of the theory of role morality is F.H.
BRADLEY, My Station and Its Duties, in ETHICAL STUDIES 160 (2d ed. 1927). The theory is
discussed in D. EMMETr, RULES, ROLES AND RELATIONS 139-82 (1966); M. KADISH & S.
KADISH, DISCRETION TO DISOBEY 15-36 (1973); B. WILLIAMS, MORALITY - AN INTRODUCTION
TO ETHICS 51-58 (1972). It is applied to lawyers in Fried, supra note 17; Wasserstrom,
Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues, 5 HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (1975). For a strong
criticism of the view, see JEAN-PAUL SARTRE, BEING AND NOTHINGNESS 55-73 (1952);
Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L.
REV. 29, 30-39, 91-113. I have received too late to consider A. GOLDMAN, THE MORAL
FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1980); the entire book is devoted to the question of
whether professionals have separate role moralities. The legal profession is considered at
90-155.
28. Ladd, supra note 26, at 155.
29. See, e.g., E. GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959).
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some of its precepts pertain only to individuals in special situations. The
duty of charity, for example, applies only to the prosperous; the duty to
repay debts, only to debtors. These are not different moralities; they are
parts of ordinary morality. Similarly, the duty of partisan zeal in a legal
context applies only to lawyers, but this does not make it a different
morality - rather, it is a special district of the universal morality.30
Implicit in this argument is a rejection of the analogy that gives our
examples their power - the analogy that likens a lawyer helping a
client evade a debt by pleading the statute of limitations to a lay-person
becoming an accomplice-in-dishonor. The argument appears to answer
the problem posed by the examples. The lawyers involved were not
required to act as laymen would, because no layman is ever in
circumstances sufficiently like the lawyer's to make the analogy
appropriate.
Why is this? The answer must lie in the fact that the lawyer
pleading the statute of limitations is not just an accomplice in the
client's unworthy designs; he is also involved in administering the law,
a fact which in itself alters the moral dimensions of the situation.
But why should the fact that the lawyer is administering the law as
well as assisting the client make any moral difference? The answer,
evidently, must lie in the claim that the law is a system with moral
authority. This need not be absolute authority (else civil disobedience
would always be immoral, an absurd suggestion), but it is plausible to
assume that the law carries at least some moral weight over and above
the system of legal sanctions. Particularly in a democracy, it seems that
the law embodies the social contract that enables us to live together. Let
us call this view the normative conception of law.
There is another side to the story, however. The law can often be an
instrument of oppression and injustice, used by some individuals or
classes in society against others. In that case its moral authority over
the victims evaporates: I may yield to the blackjack, but I owe it
nothing. And even when the law is not intended to oppress, it can
frequently be manipulated to oppress in specific cases. Let us call this
way of treating the law the instrumental conception of law. Viewed this
way, the social contract does not lift us out of the war of all against all.
It is just another weapon in that war.
The problem is that, in an adversary system, the lawyer's job is
often to treat all law as instrumental: laws are to be manipulated in
order to attain the client's ends. This point is well-expressed by the
30. The importance of this point was emphasized to me by Robert Condlin and Ted
Finman. This part of my discussion owes much to conversations with Condlin.
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Japanese novelist Yasunari Kawabata: "When a law is made, the
cunning that finds loopholes goes to work. We cannot deny that there is
a certain slyness . . . , a slyness which, when rules are written to
prevent slyness, makes use of the rules themselves."31 If it is true that
the lawyer's role transforms law from a normative to an instrumental
system, then it would be mystification to call such behavior "enforcing
the authority of the law;" it is strategic behavior designed to win, with
little more to be said. In that case the argument designed to assimilate
role morality to ordinary morality does not succeed.
The issue between these positions is not a simple one. My purpose is
not to settle the issue, only to raise it.
Problems continue even if we allow the distinction between role
morality and ordinary morality. In each of the examples, the lawyer is
asked to do something that seems to be morally unacceptable. How can
appealing to the role justify the action? The obvious move is to claim
that (1) the moral responsibility for the actions falls on the role and not
on the role-agent,32 and (2) the role itself is morally desirable. The first
of these, however, seems simply false. We would not allow a torturer to
evade moral responsibility by saying, "I personally would never pull out
your toenails, but that's my job." If the role is immoral, the agent
becomes immoral by acceding to it. Thus, the whole burden of the
argument falls on the claim that the role is a morally good one. But this
in its turn may not matter. In the second example, we might find
ourselves inclined to say, "Who cares about the role? All that matters is
that this lawyer is loosing a mad rapist on the city." The goodness of the
role matters only if we do not evaluate role-derived actions as isolated
cases, but think of them as instances of policies which are morally good.
If we describe what the lawyer is doing as "defending the right of hn
improperly tried individual to his freedom" rather than "loosing a mad
rapist on the city," his act seems to promote the public interest.
The question, then, is whether the individual action or the general
policy under which it is subsumed is the logical subject of moral
evaluation; whether, to put it another way, the lawyer evaluates his
actions on a retail or wholesale basis. Let us call the former the doctrine
of Acts Over Policies, the latter, the doctrine of Policies Over Acts. This
issue appeared in the discussion of utilitarianism in the 1950's: on the
31. Y. KAWABATA, THE MASTER OF Go 54 (1972).
32. Lawyers commonly think this way when they are engaged in actions they find
odious. See Brazil, The Attorney as Victim: Toward More Candor About the Psychological
Price Tag of Litigation Practice, 3 J. LEGAL PROF. 107 (1978); Curtis, The Ethics of
Advocacy, 4 STAN. L. REV. 3 (1952); Postema, Moral Responsibility in Professional
Ethics, 55 N.Y.U.L. REV. - (1980).
[VOL. 40
LEGAL ETHICS
Acts Over Policies approach ("act-utilitarianism" in the literature) the
agent was supposed to do the action that created the greatest utility,
while on the Policies Over Acts approach ("rule-utilitarianism") he was
supposed to follow the rule that created the greatest utility even if it
was harmful on the given occasion. 3
3
The appeal to role morality assumes that Policies Over Acts is the
right approach - that, for instance, if the policy of zealous advocacy is a
good one, the lawyer should follow it even on the occasions when he
knows it will result in harm. And indeed, there is a good reason for
putting policies over acts: it leads to greater predictability and
regularity in social behavior. If we could not count on persons occupying
certain social roles to act according to the expectations of the roles, we
would live in a very capricious society indeed.
A strong argument may be made, however, in favor of Acts Over
Policies. An agent confronts his decisions one at a time. If, after
balancing the wrong done by breaking role against the wrong done by
acting in role, he sees that an action is morally unacceptable, it cannot
be correct to sweep this insight under the rug by saying that the
individual action is not the logical subject of moral evaluation. As
Bernard Williams puts it in an argument against rule-utilitarianism,
"Whatever the general utility of having a certain rule, if one has
actually reached the point of seeing that the utility of breaking it on a
certain occasion is greater than that of following it, then surely it would
be pure irrationality not to break it?"'34
This issue deserves careful consideration, for if actions rather than
policies are the objects of moral evaluations, it may not be possible to
justify behavior by appealing to social roles.
Another problem emerges when we analyze the lawyer's role a bit
more carefully. It includes and is defined by the ultimate goals of the
role (representing individuals and groups in legal processes), the
ground-rules that constrain the actions performed in pursuit of these
goals (such as the ABA Code), the specific duties which the ultimate
goals imply, and the typical practices lawyers engage in because other
lawyers do.
This last, as we have seen, may be viewed as composed of outcomes
to Prisoner's Dilemma games. We may take as examples the practice of
puffery in negotiation; or the use of dilatory tactics; or attempting to
drive up the other side's legal costs by getting its counsel disqualified.
33. Some classic papers in this debate are collected in CONTEMPORARY UTILITARIANISM
(M. Bayles ed. 1968).
34. B. WILLIAMS, supra note 27, at 102.
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Practices such as these tend, I have argued, to move the behavior of the
profession toward its lowest common denominator. If they are to be
justified by reference to role morality, even indirectly through the
argument that they are corollaries to the lawyer's duty to give the client
the best possible representation, then an unpleasant result follows: role
morality justifies any practice the profession habitually engages in.
All this is not intended to suggest that the theory of role morality is
incoherent, just that if it is to be made coherent, a sophisticated account
must be offered of the distinction, an account that spells out exactly how
moral responsibility is to be assumed by the role, and how role morality
is to be appealed to in offering justifications for action.
AN ANALOGY TO PUBLIC OFFICIALS
The conflict between role obligations and ordinary morality is a
familiar one in politics, where it is especially clear that to act at all is to
risk dirty hands. 5 Machiavelli wrote that he loved his native city better
than his own soul, prompting the following comment from one modern
writer:
At the time he wrote, the expression was no clich6 but meant
literally that one was prepared to forfeit an everlasting life or to
risk the punishments of hell for the sake of one's city. The question,
as Machiavelli saw it, was not whether one loved God more than
the world, but whether one was capable of loving the world more
than one's own self.3
6
Moral compromise is the risk if one is to act in the public realm at
all; to try to keep clean hands is self-indulgent. The ordinary morality of
clean hands is the morality of private life; it is superseded by a role
morality when one becomes a public official precisely because the
community's interest is more important than one's own private interest.
That, at any rate, is the most plausible justification of political morality.
It does not mean that ordinary morality loses its force - Machiavelli
may lose his soul - but this says only that the moral dilemma which is
resolved in favor of political morality is a genuine dilemma.37
35. The phrase is taken from Sartre's play of the same title. Michael Walzer
formulates the problem in this way in his essay Political Action; The Problem of Dirty
Hands, in WAR AND MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 62 (1974).
36. H. ARENDT, ON REVOLUTION 289 n.19 (1963).
37. On the conflict between the morality of public officials and ordinary morality, see
A. DONAGAN, THE THEORY OF MORALITY 180-89 (1977); A. GOLDMAN, supra note 27 at
62-89; M. WALZER, supra note 35; M. WEBER, Politics as a Vocation, in FROM MAX WEBER:
ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 77 (1946); Hampshire, Public and Private Morality, Williams, Politics
and Moral Character, and Nagel, Ruthlessness in Public Life, in PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
MORALITY 23, 55, 75 (1978).
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The lawyer resembles the public official in certain respects.
Commentators have described lawyers as "free-lance bureaucrats, not
tied to any major established bureaucracy, who can be hired to use,
typically in a bureaucratic setting, bureaucratic skills . ,,38 The
lawyer, moreover, like the politician, seeks to promote certain interests
through verbal and persuasive means often backed by threats, in a
situation that is frequently marked by maneuvering and mistrust. Most
importantly, the lawyer, like the public official, is acting on behalf of
someone else; both lawyer and official represent a constituency.
39
But there's the rub. The conflict between political and ordinary
morality was resolved in favor of the former only because of the
importance of the public interest, as expressed, for example, in the
doctrine of "reasons of state." The lawyer, however, typically represents
private and not public interests. Even so-called "public interest" lawyers
treat thepublic interest they hope to represent through the persons of
private clients. How can the attorney claim to be bound by the "dirty
hands" morality of public officials when he or she is acting on behalf of
a merely private interest? The step from "reasons of state" to "reasons of
Driver's Insurance Company" or "reasons of David Luban" as a
justification for violating someone's moral rights is a step into
absurdity.
Think once again of the statute-of-limitations dilemma posed in the
first example. Everyone knows that it is immoral to welch on a debt:
How is a lawyer permitted to do for the client what is immoral for either
to do for himself?
Formulating our problem in this way suggests two lines of
investigation. First, one could explore more thoroughly the similarities
and differences between the concepts of legal and political representa-
tion. This involves coming to grips with the distinction between public
and private interests (a fundamental problem of social decision theory4 °)
and the claim of the community's interest to precedence over private
interests (a fundamental problem in the theory of political obligation).
Second, one could focus directly on the lawyer viewed as a functionary of
the legal system (hence, as a public official) and attempt to transfer the
theory of political morality directly to the context of lawyering. This is
38. Dauer & Leff, Correspondence, 86 YALE L.J. 573, 581 (1977).
39. In the original Roman usage the term "clientela" included political dependency as
one of its senses and had nothing to do with lawyers. E. BADIAN, FOREIGN CLIENTELAE
(264-70 B.C.) 1-13 (1958).
40. See, e.g., K. Amiow, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2nd ed. 1963); M.
OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS
(1965); A. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE (1970); E. ULLMAN-MARGALIT, THE
EMERGENCE OF NoRms (1977).
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where particulars must be addressed. What is the public role of the
securities lawyer? How candid must a lawyer be in a negotiation?
Whose confidence must corporate counsel keep? Can a legal services
attorney help an indigent client evade an unfair law that is victimizing
her? The only way to analyze the duties of the lawyer as public official
is to get down to cases.
The strategy in both these approaches, of course, is to investigate
hard questions in legal ethics by looking for analogies in better-explored
areas of political theory. It remains to be seen how fruitful such a
strategy proves to be. The analogy to political morality appears to be
one of the most promising approaches to the subject.
THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM
The Joint Conference Report of the ABA-AALS 41 begins by
claiming that the major obstacle to fostering an understanding of
lawyers' professional responsibility is the failure to understand the
rationale of the adversary system. The task, then, is to provide this
rationale, which, in turn, may justify lawyers' roles in that system.
In the narrow sense of the term, "the adversary system" refers only
to a method of conducting courtroom litigation. However, in a broader
sense other lawyering functions are also adversarial: negotiation is a
comparatively clear example, but even advising a client and filling out
forms may assume an adversarial format. Generally speaking, a lawyer
will operate in an adversarial format when his client's gain is another
party's loss. Despite the very real differences among tasks, they involve
similar moral dilemmas, arising from conflicts between the lawyer's
duty to promote his client's interests and other moral duties.
For the sake of simplicity, let us focus on the adversary system as it
works in litigation. Three main justifications are usually offered for it:
A. The Truth Theory suggests that the adversary system is the best
method for arriving at the truth, hence yielding a just outcome. This
theory is based on the idea, very similar to Sir Karl Popper's theory of
scientific rationality,4 2 that the way to get at the truth is a
wholehearted dialectic of conjecture and refutation. If each side
attempts to prove its case, with the other side trying as energetically as
possible to assault the steps of the proof, it is more likely that all of the
aspects of the situation will be presented to the fact-finder than if it
attempts to investigate for itself with the help of the lawyers.
41. See note 4 and accompanying text supra.
42. K. POPPER, CONJECTURES AND REFUTATIONS: THE GROWTH OF SCIENTIFIC KNOW-
LEDGE iv, 33-65, 114-19, 353, 355-63 (1963).
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This theory may bring a smile to the lips of a trial lawyer. The two
adversary attorneys are each under an obligation to present the facts in
the manner most consistent with his client's position - to prevent the
introduction of unfavorable evidence, to undermine the credibility of
opposing witnesses, to set unfavorable facts in a context in which their
importance is minimized. The assumption is that two such accounts will
cancel out, leaving the truth of the matter. But there is no reason to
think this is so43 - they may simply pile up the confusion, particularly
in those frequent cases when the facts in question concern someone's
character or state of mind. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that the
tricks of the trial lawyer's trade are designed to obfuscate unpleasant
truths.
B. The Rights Theory suggests that the real goal of the adversary
system is not to arrive at the truth of the matter, but to guarantee that
each party to the proceeding has his rights fully protected by an
advocate. Particularly in a criminal proceeding, protection of the rights
of the accused is the paramount consideration,44 and this protection
requires an advocate whose loyalties are undivided.
This theory, too, has its problems. What is the lawyer in Example 4
to do when his client insists that he press the defense of unchastity?
Clearly, advancing the defense violates the moral rights of the victim,
who is being damaged by the attorney. One might reply that the
attorney's job deals with legal and not moral rights; but if we are
looking for a moral justification of the attorney's job, this reply begs the
question.
The Rights Theory would work if legal rights were more important
than moral rights, or if the adversary system was the best way of
protecting both. The first idea has no plausibility at all; why, in our
examples, are the legal rights of the debtor more important than the
moral rights of the creditor, the legal rights of the rapist more
important than the moral rights of his once-and-future victims, the
legal rights of the defendant's insurance company more important than
the moral rights of the youth? Nor will the adversary system protect
moral rights: it commits the advocate to the project of promoting his
client's legal rights whether they are moral or not.
It is not even clear that the adversary system is the best way of
defending legal rights. Often it is the best lawyer, not the best case, that
wins. (Consider the old cynicism, "A jury is twelve men and women
deciding who has the better lawyer.") Sometimes a lawyer can get
43. See J. THIBAUT & L. WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS
(1975).
44. M. FREEDMAN, supra note 22, at 1-8.
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results for the client to which the client is not entitled. In that case, it is
wrong to say that the proceeding has defended the winner's legal rights;
in reality, it has denied the loser's legal rights.45
C. The Checks-and-Balances Theory invokes the notion of what
might be called moral division of labor. The idea is that behavior which
looks wrong from the viewpoint of ordinary morality is justified by the
existence of other social roles, the purpose of which is to counteract the
excesses resulting from role-behavior.46 Zealous advocacy is justified by
the fact that each side is furnished with a zealous advocate. In litigation
the impartial arbiter provides a further check.
Will this justify the adversary system? Suppose that a lawyer is
about to embark on a course of action that is unjustified from the point
of view of ordinary morality, such as attempting to win an unfair,
lopsided judgment for his client. If the lawyer is a zealous adversary
advocate he will do whatever he can to avoid the opposing counsel's
attempts to foil him in his designs. But in that case, how can he claim
that the existence of the opposing counsel morally justifies him in his
action? Certainly the fact that a man has a bodyguard in no way
excuses you for trying to kill him, particularly if you bend all your
ingenuity to avoiding the bodyguard.
There is another problem with the Checks-and-Balances Theory. It
attempts to justify a system of roles by the fact that the system is
self-correcting - in other words, injuries perpetrated by one part of the
system will be rectified by another. Rectification, however, is seldom
instantaneous; it generally costs time, energy, money, worry, and an
arduous passage through the bureaucratic straits. Thus, even if the
system of checks-and-balances eventually yields a morally equitable
result, the process itself inflicts damages. It appears, then, that the
existence of the system cannot morally justify inequitable acts under-
taken within it. The system is not the solution.
None of these arguments is intended to be the last word on the
subject. To say, moreover, that three standard justifications for the
adversary system do not work is nob to say that the adversary system is
not justified. This discussion is intended only to show that the
philosophical work involved in justifying the adversary system as it is
used to provide a foundation for legal ethics remains to be done. It is an
open problem.
45. Legal Realists might object that there are no legal entitlements apart from what
the courts may be predicted to give. This objection, however, does not defend the adversary
system, for it shows that any system that merely decides cases is a perfect defender of
legal rights.
46. Nagel, supra note 37, at 85-86, defends a checks-and-balances theory for public
officials.
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THE DELIVERY OF LEGAL SERVICES
Clients in the United States obtain legal services in three ways: by
hiring a lawyer, by receiving philanthropic "pro bono publico" legal
assistance, or by receiving legal aid from legal services organizations
and judicare or pre-paid plans. Legal services are expensive, and
consequently indigents are totally dependent on pro bono or legal aid
lawyers for their needs. These, however, do not come close to meeting
the enormous demand.47 Moreover, middle-income individuals who do
not qualify as indigents and are therefore not eligible for legal aid may
not be able to afford lawyers. It has been claimed that middle- and
lower-income people have little need for lawyers;48 this does not,
however, appear to be borne out by the facts.4 9 The problem is
exacerbated by the fact that legal aid organizations, overwhelmed by
applications, must often choose between providing low-quality service to
all comers or performing "triage" by concentrating on legal problems
which involve large numbers of people - in which case the poor person
with an unusual legal problem is out of luck.5"
This state of affairs may not appear to present moral problems.
Lawyers, like anyone else, have a right to sell their services to
whomever they want. The fact that a poor person cannot afford a lawyer
is no different from the fact that a poor person cannot afford a chauffeur
- no one has a right to another's beneficence. 5'
This argument overlooks an important point about the lawyer's
role, however. The lawyer is in part a creation of the legal system, "an
officer of the court," and the legal system has as its function the
adjudication and distribution of legal rights. It is a fact of life that
access to the system often requires a lawyer. Indeed, the organized bar
has worked energetically to ensure that the number of processes that
47. One survey estimates that "the nation's 320 federally-funded local legal service
groups (which don't handle criminal matters) can serve only about 1.5 million of this
country's 29 million poor." J. JENKINS, FUTURELAW: LAWYERS CONFRONT THE 21ST CENTURY
6 (BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, INC. REPORT 1979).
48. Abel, Socializing the Legal Profession, 1 LAW & Soc. POL'Y. Q. 5, 13-19 (1979).
49. See L. BROWN & E. DAUER, PLANNING BY LAWYERS - MATERIALS ON A
NONADVERSARIAL LEGAL PROCESS 149-63 (1978); Carlin & Howard, Legal Representation
and Class Justice, 12 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 381 (1965).
50. See Bellow & Kettleson, The Mirror of Public Interest Ethics: Problems and
Paradoxes, in PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: A GUIDE FOR ATTORNEYS 219 (ABA 1978);
Bellow, Turning Solutions Into Problems: The Legal Aid Experience, 1977 NLADA
BRIEFCASE 620.
51. See Fried, supra note 17, at 1076-78 (defending the lawyer's right to sell his
services to whomever he wants).
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formally require a lawyer is as large as possible.5 2 To put legal services
on the market is thus in practice to deny legal rights to those who
cannot afford a lawyer. Your legal rights, however, should not depend
on how much money you have. Our society has already recognized that
a lawyer must be provided to indigents charged with felonies,
5 3
misdemeanors when the sentence could be a jail term,5 4 and juvenile
delinquency.5 5 People should not have to face loss of liberty simply
because they are unable effectively to assert their legal rights. But
certainly there are other legal processes in which the inability to assert
legal rights can have consequences as drastic as brief loss of liberty: loss
of custody of a child, of a multi-thousand dollar judgment, of
compensation for a serious injury, or even of a driver's license.56 This
suggests that legal services should be provided free or at a reduced cost
whenever an individual is facing extremely severe consequences
through inability to assert his legal rights because he cannot afford
legal assistance.
5 7
If this argument is right, how should legal services be provided to
those who cannot afford them? This may appear to be a question safely
left to the welfare economists and legislators. I believe, however, that
important philosophical questions arise in this area, questions that
depend on an analysis of the lawyer's role obligations. I shall illustrate
by briefly discussing one recent proposal, the imposition of a pro bono
duty of (say) forty hours per year on lawyers. 58 The objection can be
raised that this imposes an undue burden on the marginal practitioner
who is barely eking out a living. A more fundamental objection,
however, is that a pro bono duty in effect selectively taxes lawyers to
provide a public service. This seems quite inequitable; if it is in the
52. See, e.g., Florida Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So. 2d 1186 (Fla. 1978) (a secretarial
service that assists people in filling out forms required in uncontested divorces is engaging
in the unauthorized practice of law).
53. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
54. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972).
55. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
56. See Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. at 44-66 (J. Powell, concurring).
57. It appeared at one point that a due process right to appointed counsel would
emerge following Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371 (1971) (a state-imposed filing fee for
divorce denies due process by denying indigents access to the court), but the Court has
interpreted Boddie very narrowly. See United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1973); Ortwein
v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (per curiam); Lassiter v. Dep't of Social Servs., No. 79-6423
(., filed - , 1979); Michelman, The Supreme Court and Litigation Access Fees: The
Right to Protect One's Rights (pt. 1) 1973 DUKE L. J. 1153.
58. SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON THE LAWYER'S PRO BONO OBLIGATIONS, ASSOCIATION OF THE
BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, TOWARD A MANDATORY CONTRIBUTION OF PUBLIC SERVICE
PRACTICE BY EVERY LAWYER 5, 30-32 (1979) (judicial theories for denying compensation to
court-appointed attorneys are based on the lawyer's role).
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public interest to make legal services available to all, the expense
should fall on the entire public, not just on the lawyers. Public defenders
are financed by public monies; why not lawyers for indigents and
middle-income people as well?
The proponent of the pro bono duty replies that a major reason
indigents and middle-income people need expensive legal services is
that the profession has used its privilege of self-regulation to its own
advantage. It is perverse for the profession to insist that a lawyer be
required, for example, to fill out routine forms, 59 while arguing at the
same time that if the public wants everyone to have the lawyer's
services it must pay the market rate. The pro bono duty, rather than
constituting a tax on lawyers, can be viewed as a fee which they pay the
public in return for special privileges granted to the legal profession.
60
The real issue here is the lawyer's role. Many different obligations
are built into it; to what extent do these include a duty to further the
general legal welfare? The ABA's formal answer is: not much. Only
public interest lawyers have an obligation to assure that "maximum"
legal services are made available where they are needed; for the rest of
the bar, working for the public good is merely "aspirational."' The
question, however, is not settled by ABA Formal Opinions alone. The
deeper issue is whether the legal profession is to be viewed as
fundamentally part of the private sector that happens to have as its
stock-in-trade expertise in dealing with the legal system, or fun-
damentally an arm of the legal system that happens to compensate
itself by billing private clients. This is not just a question about whether
the bottle is half-full or half-empty. If the lawyer is essentially a private
individual, then special justification must be given for a tax which is
imposed on him selectively. If, on the other hand, the lawyer is
essentially a creature of the court - hence, of the sovereign public
which created the courts - he functions to promote whatever values the
legal system itself is supposed to promote. The public then has the right
to define the lawyer's role with those values in mind.
According to this analysis, the question of the pro bono duty is not
just a question of distributive justice, but also is a debate over the
nature of the lawyer's role and its obligations. It thus forms part of the
subject of legal ethics.
59. Well known examples of this may be found in the areas of probate, uncontested
divorces, and real estate title searches. See also Florida Bar v. Brumbaugh, 355 So. 2d
1186 (Fla. 1978).
60. See note 58 supra.
61. See ABA CODE, supra note 6, at Canon 2; ABA COMM. ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS,
OPINIONS, Nos. 324 (1970), 334 (1974), INFORMAL OPINIONS, No. 1208 (1972); Bellow &
Kettleson, supra note 50.
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THE TEACHING OF LEGAL ETHICS
A black-letter approach to legal ethics does not, I have argued,
teach legal ethics at all. It teaches the ABA Code of Professional
Responsibility, which is unlikely to be of much help in a genuine moral
dilemma.
Professional-responsibility teachers, however, are frequently un-
sure as to what besides the Code should go into the class. There is a
strong sentiment against "preachy" courses that attempt to tell law
students about the Good, the True, and the Beautiful. Various reasons
are given to back up this sentiment: preachiness is condescending or
even insulting insofar as it assumes that the student is not moral or
intelligent enough to make up his own mind about right and wrong; or,
morals is a matter of opinion; or, if a person is not moral by the time he
gets to law school, an ethics class is not going to make him moral; or, a
lawyer's morality is the written code of ethics.
Obviously, some of these reasons are better than others. Our
discussion, however, suggests the following reflections. First, it will not
be possible to count on students' preformed moral personalities to
resolve the ethical problems they will face as lawyers, because their
personalities are preformed by ordinary morality. In cases of severe
conflict between ordinary morality and role obligations, the most
common reaction is simply to suspend moral judgment and do whatever
the role demands. This, of course, merely evades ethical problems rather
than solves them.
Second, the fact that moral dilemmas involve genuine clashes of
values may imply that there will be no automatic procedure for
resolving them, and thus that the individual judgment of the lawyer
will play the crucial role. This makes it hard to see how legal ethics can
be taught, for an entire semester of agonizing problems with no
solutions will foster nothing but skepticism and cynicism.
This pessimistic view is not forced on us, however. The fact that
moral dilemmas cannot be solved by a "rational computational moral-
ity" (to use Stuart Hampshire's phrase62) does not mean they'are merely
the subject of opinion with nothing more to be said. Judgment may be
trained: a connoisseur of wine cannot give a decision-procedure for what
he does, but that in no way implies that his judgment is just talk. The
62. Hampshire, Morality and Pessimism and Public and Private Morality, in PUBLIC
AND PRIVATE MORALITY 1, 23 (1978). See T. NAGEL, The Fragmentation of Value, in MORTAL
QUESTIONS 128 (1979).
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problem is how one sets about training moral judgment. I suggest two
approaches:
(1) According to Aristotle, "it is by doing just acts that the just
man is produced," "states of character arise out of like activities," and
"the virtues we get by first exercising them. '6 3 The Aristotelian
approach to teaching practical judgment places the student in a
situation where practical judgments must be made. The appropriate
setting for this is the legal clinic, in which students handle actual cases
under the supervision of faculty members who attempt to provide
theoretical instruction organized around the practice in which the
students are engaged. Both philosophical and empirical work need to be
done around this possibility, the former to assess the theory of moral
epistemology on which the approach rests, and the latter to discover
whether the clinics in fact provide a better setting than classrooms for
students to address ethical problems.6 4
(2) The Aristotelian approach may seem merely to push the
problem back one step, however. If problems of legal ethics do not have
a decision-procedure, just what is it that students are supposed to be
trained to do? Encountering a problem that no one can tell him how to
solve is not likely to train a student to do anything.
Despite the absence of a decision-procedure, however, a teacher may
be able to explain how to think about problems. The role of the legal
ethics course should be to attempt to equip students with intellectual
skills they can use to pinpoint conflicts, analyze arguments, and discuss
the questions of principle that underlie various ethical problems.6 5 A
natural place to look for materials useful to such an enterprise is moral
philosophy; these may complement the familiar public-policy approach
utilized in traditional legal analysis.66 It is unlikely, however, that
discussions pitched at the level of generality of, for example, debates
over utilitarianism, will be useful in a legal ethics course, if only for the
reason that law students always have something better to do than read
them. What is needed is a literature that is philosophically sophisti-
63. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 1105b9, 1103b21, 1103a32 (1973).
64. M. KELLY, supra note 2, at 39-43, 51; Condlin, Socrates's New Clothes:
Substituting Persuasion for Learning in Clinical Practice Instruction, 40 MD. L. REV. -
(1981); Simon, Homo Psychologicus: Notes on a New Legal Formalism, 32 STAN. L. REV.
487 (1980); Condlin, Clinical Education and Instrumental Morality (unpublished paper)
(copy on file with Center for Philosophy and Public Policy, University of Maryland at
College Park).
65. See Nagel, supra note 62, at 135-37; C. WEGENER, LIBERAL EDUCATION AND THE
MODERN UNIVERSITY 62-160 (1978).
66. For a spirited defense of the role of moral philosophy in jurisprudence, see R.
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).
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cated but specific to the legal context. In recent years, applied ethics has
enjoyed a vigorous growth in interest; there have been impressive
achievements, combining detailed empirical work with state-of-the-art
moral philosophy. We may expect that a dialogue between lawyers and
philosophers will generate a wealth of pedagogically valuable material
on legal ethics. 67 Of course, new material does not change what goes on
in a classroom; but creating it will be an important step.
67. THE COUNCIL FOR PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES, THE INSTITUTE ON LAW AND ETHICS,
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY IN THE LAW: A CURRICULUM REPORT (S. Gorovitz & B. Miller
eds. Summer 1977).
